Heightened nuclear risks in South Asia—most recently demonstrated in February 2019 with the first cross-border air strikes exchange between nuclear powers—have revived the study of conflict dynamics on the subcontinent. However, this analytical renaissance has tended to focus on crises that prompt major strategic escalation dynamics, while discounting a range of limited war and crisis scenarios that may not meet the traditional “interstate war” definition. Implicit is the assumption that these scenarios are not escalatory and that certain forms of warfare can in fact remain “limited”. While one frequently cited route across the nuclear threshold envisions Pakistani tactical nuclear use in response to an all-out Indian ground offensive (a “Cold Start” operation), several other potential pathways likewise carry this risk. Alternative seemingly controllable conflict scenarios including Line of Control artillery duels, reciprocal air strikes, fait accompli operations, and naval blockades also carry significant risk of increased intensity, risking deliberate and inadvertent escalation and potentially consideration of nuclear use. This paper articulates these escalation pathways and then evaluates a range of de-escalation trajectories and their challenges during high-intensity conflict. A clear understanding of both the actors involved in third-party crisis management and previous such efforts can inform future practice. Based on these inputs and the outlined escalation scenarios, we identify a variety of information-, incentive-, and intervention-based mechanisms and deliverables available to crisis managers seeking to terminate conflict between India and Pakistan.